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activity, engendering reliance thereon, it has a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of the lighthouses or to warn the
public that the lighthouses are no longer operating properly. The
Court does not look to the specific activity; it merely looks to the
fact that the government has undertaken something which it is
not required to do. A private individual in similar circumstances
would be liable if he did not use reasonable care. Thus the statute
makes the government liable.
The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952), lists several exceptions
to the statute granting consent for the government to be sued. The
Feres and Dalehite cases add one more-the government does not
consent to be sued for negligence in the performance of uniquely
governmental activities. This exception is now limited by the decision in the principal case. The court distinguishes between unique
activities which the government is required to undertake and those
which it is not required to undertake. The statute establishes liability for negligence in the performance of the latter.
W. A. K.

WoKMxEW's COMPENSAION-MEANING AND EFFECT oF CAsuAL

EMPLOYER PRovso.-In an action to recover damages for injuries
suffered while plaintiff was driving a truck belonging to the defendant, the circuit court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and the
defendant prosecuted a writ of error. Held, on appeal, that where
defendant, engaged in a business, although operating it intermittently, had employed plaintiff as a sawyer and truck driver for
approximately two years, plaintiff working regularly six days a week
and being paid at regular twoweek intervals, defendant was an
employer within the workmen's compensation statute; and plaintiff's contributory negligence and assumption of risk were not available as defenses. Walls v. McKinney, 81 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1954).
In the principal case, the court, at page 906, says, "The record
in this case shows that the defendant was not a casual employer.
• . ." This treatment of who is or is not a casual employer within
the meaning of W. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1949), is
probably of no importance in the principal case insofar as the result
is concerned, because the defendant probably had more than three
employees. However, it does raise, and leaves unanswered, some
interesting questions concerning the definition of "casual employers"
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contained in section 1, and the effect of the section upon the scope
of the whole chapter.
W. VA. CoDE c. 23, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955), definies "casual
employers" as ". . . employers of not more than three employees
for a period of not more than one month.. ." It further provides
that such employers may elect to contribute to the compensation
fund but that their failure to do so shall not deprive them of the
common law defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk,
and contributory negligence; whereas § 8 deprives other employers
within the meaning of § 1 who fail to subscribe to the workmen's compensation fund of such defenses. At the beginning of
the same paragraph of § 1, it is stated that: "All persons, firms,
associations and corporations regularly employing other persons for
the purpose of carrying on any form of industry or business in this
state . . .are employers within the meaning of this chapter and
subject to its provisions...."
The first question to arise is: How is the word "employer" used
in the "casual employer" proviso? Was the word used in the broader
ordinary meaning of one who employs or hires the services of
another, or in the more narrow sense as defined in § 1, supra? If
the statute is to be read literally, then the proviso in § 1 would
seem to read as follows: All persons regularly employing other
persons for the purpose of carrying on any business or industry in
this state who employ not more than three employees for a period
of not more than one month are casual employers. Thus the effect
of "employer" being used in this sense is immediately apparent as
setting a numerical minimum on the number of employees, the
exceeding of which will result in bringing an employer within that
class who, as a result of failing to subscribe to the compensation
fund, lose the aforementioned common law defenses. And this
appears more certain considering the decision in Drake v. Clay
Hardware & Supply Co., 110 W. Va. 63, 157 S.E. 35 (1931), which
held that the phrase "employing other persons" did not imply a
plurality of employees by the individual employer, had no significance other than that of correct grammatical construction, and that
the word as used could be applied to the sole employee of an
employer. At that time W. VA. CoDE c. 15P,§§ 9, 26 (Barnes 1923),
contained no numerical minimum. However, in 1937, the proviso,
substantially the same as it now exists, was added to W. VA. CoDE
c. 23, art. 2, § 8, by W. Va. Acts 1987, c. 104, art. 2, § 8, which
provided that those employing less than ten employees and those
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employing more than ten employees, but not in excess of sixty days
prior to the accidental death or injury, were casual employers; and
that no recovery could be had against casual employers without allegation and proof that such injuries resulted from the actual negligence of the employer. The numerical minimum first established by
this amendment should prevent another application as broad as
that laid down by the court in the Drake case, supra.
In view of the terms of the proviso as it existed in W. VA. CoD.
c. 23, art. 2, § 8 (Michie 1937), as compared with its present wordig and location in W. VA. CoDE c. 23, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955),
if the foregoing interpretation or construction would have been
justified at that time, is there any justification for not so construing
it now? By W. Va. Acts 1945, the only changes appear to have
been to delete the proviso from § 8, and add it to § 1, after having
amended if so as to decrease the number of employees and shorten
the length of time. These changes would seeii to extend the scope
of the provision to include more employers, but should in no way
do away-with requiring a minimum number of employees.
The West, Virginia definition of "casual employer" is unique
when compared with those of the other twenty-nine states which
at the present time provide for some such exemption from their
workmen's compensation statutes. The usual definition pertains
to "employees" and "employments" rather than to "employers" and
exempts casual.employees and employment, for the most part, when
employment is both casual and outside the usual course of buisiness
of .the employer. 2 Sc

tzm~EW,

WoniciMEs COMPEWSATION STA'trr=s

§ 279 (1944). It is generally held' that th&use of the. conjuildtive
"and"edtends the protection of the statute to far nore employees
and atthe same time prevents an employer from evading the statutes
by hi-ing, on a day to day or'week to week, etc., basis. Note, 107
A.L.R. 934.(1937). In construing these statutes, in the absence
of satutor definition, the usual or ordinary definition of the word
as given by the lexicographers is usually accepted. Ibid. Webster
deines "casual" as "happening without design and unexpectedly;
qecasidiial; coming without regularity." However, "casual" has
been given Al arbitrary or "word of art" meaning in West Virginia,
by sttute. 'V..VA. CODE: c. 23, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1995).
Had the intent of the West Virginia: legislature been to use
"Casual" in its ordinary sense;:it would appear to have- been relatively simple -to just- say "casuar. or even. to. leave the word out
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entirely as has been done in Texas and New York. 2 Scrwma ,-p.
cit. supra. If the word had been thus omitted, casual employers,
"casuar' here being used in its ordinary dictionary meaning, would
necessarily seem to be excluded from being employers wthin the
meaning of W. VA. CoDE c. 23, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955). The
phrases "regularly employing" and "for the purpose of carrying qn"
seem to indicate a legislative intent not to classify employers on:the
basis.of the duration of individual contracts for-hire; but rather-on
double standards of. constancy and continuity of the occurrence
of employment and the business or industry In this. .eet,.he
court was undoubtedly correct in the principal case in saying that
the defendant was not a casual employer.
Comparison with other workmen's compensation statutes as to
a clearer meaning of the "casual employer" proviso has proven unproductive since the West Virginia statute is unique. Further, an
exhaustive search has disclosed an almost complete lack of case
authority on the point of comment with the exception of Drake v.
Clay, supra. However, it appears that two quite different results
can be reached, depending upon the interpretation given the "casual
employer" proviso.
First: If the word "employer" used in the proviso is read literally, in its ordinary dictionary meaning, it brings within the
coverage of the chapter all persons, firms, associations and corporations carrying on any business in the state, regardless of the
number of employees. This interpretation would necessarily have
the effect of practically nullifying the rather obvious "word of art"
meaning of "casual employees".
Was the intent of the legislature to provide such absolute coverage that such employers as doctors, lawyers, dentists, etc., would
be included as long as one person was regularly employed?
Workmen's compensation statutes are generally held to be
social legislation and are liberally construed in favor of employees.
Chiericozzi v. Commissioner, 124 W. Va. 213, 19 S.E.2d 590 (1942).
However, there are several factors which would appear to negate
the more liberal interpretation set forth in the preceding paragraph.
These factors are: (1) the particular use and definition of "casual
employers" as set forth herein previously; (2) the alternatives which
must have been available to the legislature; (3) the less likelihood
of injury where so few employees are employed (and particularly
in such activities as mentioned); and, (4) the relatively slight social
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benefits to be had as compared with the additional clerical and
administrative work which would be required.
Second: It is submitted that the more justified and more logical
interpretation of the proviso is that our compensation statute provides that: (1) all employers who regularly employ more than
three employees for more than one month and who fail to subscribe
to the fund are deprived of their common law defenses; and, (2)
those employers who regularly employ three or less may elect to
subscribe to the fund but shall not be deprived of their common
law defenses for failing to do so.
C. S. M.
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